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Immigration has increasingly taken centre-stage in the political landscape. Part of this has been rise in far-right, anti-
immigration parties in a range of countries. Existing evidence suggests that the presence of immigrants has a substantial 
effect on the political views of the electorate, generating an advantage to these parties with anti-immigration or 
nationalist platforms. This paper explores a closely related issue but overlooked issue: how immigrant behavior is 
influenced by these parties. We focus on immigrant location decisions in Northern Italy which has seen the rise of the 
anti-immigration party Lega Nord. We construct a dataset of mayoral elections in Italy for the years 2002-2014, and 
calculate the effect of electing a mayor belonging to, or supported by Lega Nord. To identify this relationship we focus on 
mayors who have been elected with narrow margins of victory in a Regression Discontinuity framework. The election of 
Lega Nord mayor discourages immigrants from moving into the municipality.  
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The rise of parties where immigration is a core platform represents a pervasive feature of the recent 
political landscape. Potential explanations for this development are numerous. For instance, there is a 
debate over the extent to which they reflect economic, broader social or institutional factors 
(Arzheimer, 2009; Hatton, 2016). One particular focus is whether the presence of immigrants in a 
given area influences political views of the electorate. A recent literature suggests that this is the case 
and demonstrates a positive relationship between the proportion of immigrants in a given area and the 
receipt of votes by anti-immigration parties (see, for instance, Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 
2016; Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016). More generally, it has been demonstrated that immigrant inflows 
lead to an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes in a given location (Halla et al., 2012).  
The mechanism explored in this literature is how immigrant inflows shape the attitudes and voting 
patterns of natives, for instance their tendency to vote for right wing parties with anti-immigration 
platforms. One of the stated aims of these parties is to either legally restrict entry of immigrants or to 
deter them in other ways. This leads naturally to an alternative question, does the presence of anti-
immigration parties influence the location decisions of immigrants and/or ethnic minority groups?  
The previous literature treats this as a nuisance factor to be controlled for. For instance, a number of 
papers use the historical location of migrant networks as a source of exogenous variation in an attempt 
to hold immigrant sorting constant (Halla et al., 2012; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016).  
While recently Dustman et al. (2016) relies on the randomisation of the location of new immigrants to 
Denmark. We adopt an alternative approach to the existing literature and examine this related, 
important, but less explored question. 
We focus on the case of municipal elections in Northern Italy. This region has seen the ascent of a 
party with a core anti-immigration political platform, Lega Nord (the ‘Northern League’). We 
construct a dataset of municipal mayoral elections in Italy for the years 2002-2014. Our chief interest 
is in how anti-immigrant feelings and the ascent of anti-immigrant political parties influences 
immigrant location decisions. Our approach to disentangling the effect of immigration and local anti-
immigrant feeling is to focus on the effect of electing a mayor belonging to or supported by the anti-
immigration party Lega Nord on the location decisions of immigrants. We focus on narrow points of 
comparison between municipalities in a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). By comparing 
municipalities where Lega Nord mayoral candidates won or lost by small margins of victory we argue 
that we uncover credibly causal effects of anti-immigrants parties on inflows and outflows of 
immigrants. 
To summarise our results, we find that the election of a Lega Nord mayor leads to a reduction in 
immigrant numbers in the municipality. This appears to be driven by a reduction in inflows into these 
municipalities, generated by a mixture of immigrants already resident in Italy and newly registered 
immigrants. These effects are concentrated in the periods immediately following elections and where 
there is a change in mayoral type. Our evidence suggest the potential for marked changes in 
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immigrants’ behaviour as a result of recent political events such as the Brexit vote and Trump 
presidential victory where anti-immigration policies were at the forefront.  
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
The Institutional System 
As discussed above we investigate if the election of a Lega Nord Mayor in Italian municipal elections 
has an impact on the location decisions of immigrants. There are over 8,000 municipalities in Italy, 
and municipal administrations are responsible of a number of public services, such as the management 
of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage, garbage collection etc), the provision of public housing 
and transportation, nursery schools, and assistance to elderly people. Within the administration, 
Municipal Councils (Consiglio Comunale) are endowed with legislative powers, while executive 
authority is assigned to a Mayor (Sindaco) who heads an Executive Committee (Giunta Comunale). 
Given that municipal governments are responsible for a number of very important services that have a 
great impact on citizens’ daily lives, voters are generally highly interested in their composition and 
performance. This is reflected in high average voter turnout at municipal elections (73% of eligible 
voters turned out at the 2009 municipal elections). 
Municipal elections in Italy are held every 5 years.1 The electoral system for municipalities 
was changed substantially in 1993 with the introduction of the direct election of the mayor, with 
different mechanisms according to the size of the city. For municipalities with a population of fewer 
than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with a single ballot and the winning candidate is awarded a 
majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the Council. For cities with a population above 
15,000, elections are held using a dual ballot (where the second is held only if none of the candidates 
obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first ballot). For these larger municipalities the winning 
candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the Council. In practice, 
the average population size of Italian municipalities is 7,018 and only 8% of municipalities have a 
population which is greater than 15,000 inhabitants. 
In larger municipalities each mayor is endorsed by one or more lists of candidates for the 
council, each generally representing a party. In smaller municipalities each mayor is endorsed by a 
single council list. This implies that mayoral candidates of larger municipalities are endorsed by 
visible multi-party coalitions, while in smaller municipalities coalitions tend to be grouped within ad-
hoc unitary lists. These endorsements happen before the elections, and are clearly signalled during 
campaign and on the ballot paper. Importantly, no reconfigurations of coalitions are possible after the 
election.  
                                                        
1 In certain circumstances, the legislature may not survive until the end of its legislative term, e.g. because of a 
mayor’s early resignation or death. This has the added effect that municipal elections are distributed across 
different calendar years.  
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Lega Nord (or the Northern League) is a political party that was founded by Umberto Bossi at 
the end of the Eighties as a federation of several regional parties of Northern Italy. Lega Nord’s 
support base is rooted in regions of Northern Italy (in particular in Lombardia and Veneto, where they 
receive vote shares of  around 20-25% at the regional level, but also to a lesser extent in Piemonte and 
Friuli) and it represents the first party in many parts of these regions. At the national level, the 
percentage of votes in political elections for the Lega Nord was approximately 8-10% in the Nineties, 
declined to about 5 percent in 2000s, then rose again to 10-12% or more in recent years.  Since 1994, 
Lega Nord took part, allied with center-right parties, in several coalition governments led by Silvio 
Berlusconi. As part of this they obtained several national ministries, most notably the Interior Ministry 
and the Budget Ministry. Meanwhile, in 1993 a Lega Nord representative was elected as the mayor of 
Milan. The political platform of the Lega Nord comprises of political and fiscal federalism and 
regional autonomy (going as far as secession of Northern Italy or “Padania” from Italy), the end of the 
‘assistance policy’ in favour of South Italy, the protection of Northern Italian cultural differences and 
regional identities, and lower taxation, especially for small firms and entrepreneurs. In this sense, Lega 
Nord has always taken anti-establishment political positions. 
However, in the last two decades Lega Nord has increasingly focused on immigration as a key 
issue. They have taken an anti-immigration stance and exploited the fear of increasing immigration 
flows. Using populist rhetoric, Lega Nord has associated immigration with rising criminality, drugs, 
unemployment, excessive public spending and welfare crisis. In doing so, Lega Nord has, on occasion, 
used racist and xenophobic propaganda, especially against Roma and  immigrants from African 
countries. 2  Lega Nord is increasingly aligned with right wing populist parties such as France's 
National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria. This has occurred in a period in which immigration 
into Italy has increased substantially. For example, the number of non-Italians resident in Italy 
increased from 1,340,000 in 2002 to over 5 million in 2015. This increase has been spread across all 
Italian regions, but particularly in the north of Italy where there are better economic conditions 
including those areas where Lega Nord experiences strong support.  
The Data 
The empirical analysis in this paper is drawn from three data sources.  
First, we use administrative data on resident foreigners (both EU and non-EU) in each Italian 
municipality (at the end of each calendar year), available from ISTAT, the National Statistical Institute 
from year 2002-2014. 3 It is a legal requirement for all residents, both Italians and foreigners, to 
register at the municipality where one resides. The registration is not strictly enforced, but is a 
                                                        
2 For example, the current secretary general of the party recurrently spoke about “bulldozing”  to the ground 
Roma camps and likened the effects of immigration (together with the demographic decline) to “ethnic 
cleansing”. 
3 Freely available at http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html  
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requirement for access to a range of public services, such health care provision, school admission, and 
social and housing benefits. Only legal immigrants can register. 
For each year/municipality we observe the following: the number of newly registered 
foreigners coming from other municipalities; the number of cancelled foreigners going to other 
municipalities; the number of newly registered foreigners coming from abroad; the number of 
cancelled foreigners going abroad; the total number of foreigners; the municipal population. Our main 
dependent variable is the net inflow of foreigners in municipality i in year t as a percentage of its total 
population (multiplied by 100): 
 
( ) ititititNetInflow Population TotalForeigners CancelledForeigners registeredNewly −=  
 
Our second source of data relates to elections. For each election/municipality we have data on 
the number of votes obtained by each mayoral candidate in the first ballot (and in the second ballot, 
when it took place). This is obtained from the Italian Interior Ministry.4 
We focus on roughly 4,000 municipalities in Northern Italian regions (Piemonte, Lombardia, 
Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna 5) omitting municipalities in geographical 
areas in which the electoral strength of the Lega Nord is negligible. In addition, we exclude from our 
sample a number of municipalities in which we do not observe any mayoral candidate supported by 
Lega Nord. In some cases, especially in small municipalities, the lists competing for elections do not 
use the national-party labels (such as Lega Nord, Partito Democratico, etc.), but use the generic name 
“Lista Civica”, translatable as “Local List”. In most cases, this happens in very small municipalities, in 
which mayoral candidates are indeed non-partisan figures, not belonging to any national political 
party. At times this may also hide situations in which local politicians with locally-known partisan 
allegiance decide – for whichever reason – to run under a non-partisan local label.  
Finally, to avoid the potential influence of outliers we exclude observations in the 1st and 100th 
percentile of the net inflow of immigrants. This leaves us with 13,673 municipality/year observations 
(from 1,803 municipalities). Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution of the municipalities in 
our estimating sample. INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
For each municipality-election combination we observe the elected Mayor, the margin of 
victory of the winning candidate and the party (or the parties) supporting him/her. We create a 
dummy, Lega Nord, equal to one when a mayoral candidate who belongs to Lega Nord is elected  or a 
mayor is elected on a coalition ticket that includes Lega Nord and zero when a Lega Nord candidate is 
                                                        
4 See the website: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=G  
5 We exclude the region of Trentino-Alto Adige both due to issues with data availability and due to the different 
electoral system in two of its constituent provinces, Trento and Bolzano. 
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present but not elected.6 We rescale the margin of victory such that it is positive for a victory by a 
Lega Nord mayoral candidate or a candidate supported by Lega Nord and negative when the winning 
mayoral candidate was not supported by Lega Nord. In the cases where a second round is held we use 
these votes as they determine the final electoral outcome.  
Finally, we gather data on the geographic and economic characteristics of each municipality 
(altitude, municipal area, urbanization degree, coastal town, average years of education, average age, 
employment rate, share of employment in agriculture, industry, services) from ISTAT’s Italian Census 
of Population (from years 2001 and 2011). We also use data on average municipal taxable income that 
is sourced from the Economic Ministry. 
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The 
inflow of immigrants (as a percentage of municipal population) is 1.64 percentage points, the outflow 
is 1.01 percentage points, and hence the net inflow is 0.63 percentage points. In 28% of cases of our 
election outcomes we observe a Lega Nord Mayor. The average margin of victory is 16%. The mean 
municipal population in our sample is about 15,000 and the average years of education are 9. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
3. METHODOLOGY  
We start with the following model: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 =  𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗      (1) 
 
where Immi,t+j is a measure of immigration into municipality i at time t+j, this is initially NetInflow but 
in subsequent estimates we consider alternative immigration flow measures. LegaNord is a binary 
indicator that municipality i has a Mayor elected in year t who is a member of, or is supported by, 
Lega Nord. We evaluate the impact of the election of a Lega Nord Mayor on the flow of immigrants in 
the same year of the election (j=0) and in the subsequent years following the election (j=1, 2, 3, 4). X 
is a vector of municipality characteristics and collects the intercept. We include in X provincial fixed 
effects and year fixed effects.. 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. The parameter of interest is γ and provides the 
conditional correlation between a Lega Nord Mayor and Municipal migrant flows. As we consider 
multiple observations for each municipality standard errors are clustered at the municipal level in all 
regressions.  
The main threat to causal interpretation of (1) is the reverse causality that is the focus of the 
previous literature on immigrants and voting patterns. That is, in our case, existing immigration may                                                         
6 Lega Nord runs in about 25% of municipalities of Northern Italy, comprising two thirds of its population. Just 
over a third of municipalities in which Lega Nord runs are ruled by a mayor belonging to or supported by Lega 
Nord. We adopt this approach so as to increase the precision of estimates. In later robustness tests we examine 
variants where we use alternative approaches.  
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influence voting patterns for Lega Nord. At the same time, the existence of immigrants may in itself 
be attractive to prospective migrants, or may be indicative of local amenities that are not captured in 
X. In addition, observed and unobserved local factors (for example, economic conditions) may 
simultaneously affect both immigrant flows and votes to Lega Nord. All of these provide challenges to 
causally identifying our relationship of interest.  
Our identification approach is to focus on mayoral elections involving a Lega Nord candidate 
where there was a narrow margin of victory. This forms the basis of a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) approach (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) where the main identifying 
assumption is that all potential confounders (local conditions, amenities, the effect of past immigrant 
stock/flows) are smooth at the point of a zero margin of victory.  Hence, initially we estimate variants 
of: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 +  𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + +𝑓𝑓(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗      (2) 
 
Where f(Margin Victory) is a flexible polynomial function of the margin of victory and the interaction 
term allows for different functional forms on the two sides of the cut-off. In subsequent estimates we 
also adopt non-parametric, optimal bandwidth based approaches. Assuming that the underlying 
relationship between the flow of immigrants and the margin of victory is a smooth function, any jump 
in this relationship when a Lega Nord Mayor is elected represents evidence of a treatment effect of the 
latter.  
A standard concern with this type of identification strategy is that other relevant 
characteristics may also vary discontinuously with respect to the margin of victory. In fact, a crucial 
assumption underlying the RDD approach is that unobservable characteristics do not vary 
discontinuously around the cutoff point and the cutoff rule provides exogenous variations in the 
treatment “as good as a randomized experiment”.  
As is standard in the literature, we focus on observed characteristics and test the continuity of 
the covariate distribution at the threshold to control whether the assumptions of the RDD are satisfied. 
More precisely, estimating an analogous equation to (2) but where the dependent variable is, in turn, 
all the predetermined characteristics provides a test of whether a discontinuity is present in any of 
these variables when a Lega Nord Mayor is elected. In doing so, using the procedure by Calonico, 
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), we use an optimal bandwidth calculated as 15% above and below the 
threshold, respectively. We control for the margin of victory and for the interaction term between the 
LegaNord dummy and the forcing variable, and for provincial and electoral years fixed effects.  
Table 2 presents the resultant estimates for a range of municipal characteristics (reported in 
the first column) at the optimal bandwidth (column 1). Overall, our estimates show that a Lega Nord 
mayor is not associated with any discontinuity in municipal predetermined characteristics. Since some 
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of these characteristics are not balanced we include them as control variables in our estimating 
equations, although we stress that our main results are not influenced by their inclusion or exclusion. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
As an additional examination of our research design in Figure 2 we plot the histogram of the 
margin of victory around the zero cut-off in 50 bins. Discontinuities in the histogram at the cutoff 
point would raise concerns that the candidates are able to manipulate the margin of victory. However 
there does not appear to be any evidence of jumps or grouping of elections around the threshold in 
Figure 2. This provides a degree of confidence regarding our research design and resultant estimates. 
Nonetheless in the empirical estimation we examine the robustness of our results to variations in 
factors such as bandwidth and alternative functional forms. 
 
  INSERT FIGURE 2  
4. RESULTS 
Table 3 provides initial RDD estimates of the effect of the election of a Lega Nord mayor on net 
migration flows at the municipal level (j=0,…,4). Initially we estimate on the whole sample. We report 
a series of increasingly complete models. In column (1) we estimate the impact of a Lega Nord mayor 
controlling simply for the margin of victory, in column (2) we control for a different linear trend on 
the two sides of the cut-off.  We find that the election of a Lega Nord Mayor in a municipality induces 
a statistically significant reduction in the net inflow of immigrants of 0.07-0.08 percentage points (p-
value<0.01). 
Starting from column (3) we include linear and quadratic terms for the margin of victory. 
Initially, we include no controls, and we then add year dummies, provincial dummies and, finally, 
municipal characteristics. The underlying result is that the election of a Lega Nord mayor leads to 
lower net inflows of immigrants in the municipality. The main estimate of interest is largely 
unaffected by the choice of control vector and ranges between -0.09 and -0.10 percentage points. This 
corresponds to about 0.15 of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. Hence, our initial 
evidence suggests that narrow victories by the Lega Nord Mayors substantially reduce net immigrant 
flows into the municipality. The coefficients on the forcing variable, the Margin of Victory of Lega 
Nord, are typically near zero and not statistically significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
We next seek to examine the sensitivity of this initial finding to Local Linear Regressions and 
to variations in the bandwidth used in the RDD estimation. The optimal bandwidth – calculated 
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following the approach set out by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) – is 0.152 (below and above 
the cutoff). The Local Linear estimates with the optimal bandwidth (using only the Margin of Victory 
in linear form and allowing for a different slope on the two sides of the cut-off) and using a uniform 
kernel, are provided in the first two columns of Table 4 where we report estimates with and without 
municipal characteristics. While there is some loss in precision, the point estimates are largely 
unaffected by this alternative estimation approach with the election of Lega Nord Mayors leading to a 
-0.082 to -0.085 reduction in the flow of immigrants. For illustrative purposes Figure 3 presents these 
results where we average our outcome variable into bins of intervals (width of 0.5 percent) of the 
margin of victory. 
One concern might be that the optimal bandwidth, a –/+15% margin of victory, is quite wide 
and includes elections that might be reasonably considered far from close. To investigate this we re-
estimate our main model after narrowing the bandwidth to half the optimal. These results are reported 
in Columns 3-4. These generate larger effects of electing a Lega Nord mayor on net migration (–0.11). 
This suggests that our previous estimates are not an artefact of bandwidth choice, and if anything may 
represent conservative estimates.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
These estimated effects on Net Immigrant Flows might result from a range of underlying 
migration behaviours. Specifically, they could reflect any combination of inflows and outflows, of 
immigrants already resident legally in Italy, new legal entrants to Italy, or new registrations of 
previously illegally resident migrants. Our initial step is to decompose our estimates into inflows and 
outflows, irrespective of status of the immigrant. Table 4 reports RDD estimates separately for inflows 
(columns 1-2) and outflows (columns 3-4) that result from analogous models to our earlier net flows 
models.  
These estimates suggest that negative net flow effects reported earlier largely result from a 
reduction in inflows following the election of a Lega Nord mayor. The estimate of inflows at the 
initial bandwidth is negative, but not statistically significant at standard levels. Looking at a narrower 
bandwidth the estimates again become larger and statistically significant. In contrast, the estimate for 
outflows is never statistically different from zero. While it becomes negative at the narrower 
bandwidth it is much smaller in absolute magnitude than the effect of inflows. This evidence suggests 
that our earlier net flows estimate was driven primarily by migrants choosing not to move to 
municipalities that narrowly elect Lega Nord mayors.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
10  
We next seek to understand whether these migration patterns reflect movements of existing 
legal immigrants within Italy, or alternatively, new registrations of immigrants. It is worth re-iterating 
two points. First, the movements by existing immigrants are numerically dominant by some margin. 
Second, we cannot with our data distinguish between new arrivals (in the country) and new 
registrations (of undocumented immigrants who just acquired legal status), which we group together. 
Moreover, inflows for this group consist of new registrations in the municipality, while outflows are 
exits from Italy for individuals currently registered in the municipality. This leads to some care being 
necessary when interpreting the effects for these groups. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
Table 6 presents estimates for flows disaggregated by immigrant type at the optimal 
bandwidth. The first two columns provide RDD estimates for net flows. For both groups there is a 
reduction in net flows following the election of a Lega Nord mayor, albeit this is larger and only 
statistically significant for existing registered foreigners. We then report the same estimates split by 
inflows and outflows to the municipality. The resultant estimates are imprecise, but do suggest that the 
flow for the second group are due to new immigrants not entering or registering when Lega Nord 
mayors are elected, rather than existing foreigners exiting Italy from the municipality. The distinction 
between entering a municipality and registering is important insofar as one effect of the election of a 
Lega Nord mayor may be on marginal decisions to enter the formal sector and register as a migrant. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS 
With the relationship between Lega Nord mayoral victories and location decisions of immigration 
established, we seek to explore a range of issues related to robustness and potential mechanisms.  
 To this point our measure of Lega Nord mayors has consisted of settings where a Lega Nord 
member is either the mayoral candidate or where a Lega Nord member is part of the coalition. We 
seek to examine the robustness of our results to two alternative measures, one more extensive and the 
other more restrictive.  
The first is to more broadly consider centre-right coalitions; this recognises the fact that in 
some (small) municipalities we cannot separately identify Lega Nord candidates from other centre-
right candidates, therefore we assume that Lega Nord candidates are present inside centre-right 
coalitions.  
In Table 7 we report estimates in which we include a number of additional municipalities 
(695) that we previously excluded because we were not able to identify Lega Nord. We now treat 
centre-right coalitions in these municipalities as coalitions including Lega Nord. As can be seen in 
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column (1) and (2), the main results of interest are materially unaffected by this new definition of 
Lega Nord.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
 Another concern is that we may be introducing measurement error by treating all Lega Nord 
coalitions equally, irrespective of the running position of the Lega Nord member in the coalition. To 
investigate this aspect, we re-estimated our main models identifying coalitions as Lega Nord only if 
the LN member was the mayoral candidate or deputy mayor. We then exclude all election-
municipality observations with coalitions where there was only a minor Lega Nord involvement. 
These estimates are reported in Table 7, columns (3) and (4). These estimates are larger in absolute 
magnitude and more precise. This indicates that our estimates are driven primarily by Lega Nord 
candidates and if anything the earlier estimates were conservative. The take home message is that the 
estimates reported in Table 7 provide us with confidence that is the Lega Nord component of 
coalitions that are driving our results.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
We next explore a range of issues related to the timing of the migration effects of Lega Nord 
mayoral elections. Our approach has been, in effect, to estimate the impact of Mayoral elections on 
average annual immigration flows for each 5 years electoral cycle. A natural question is whether there 
are any temporal patterns in these migration effects. In Table 8 we first build a variable Lag that 
measures the years spent from the last election (Lag is equal to 0 for the year of election,7 1 for the 
following year, and so on). We interact Lag with LegaNord Mayor: in this way, the variable LegaNord 
Mayor measures the immediate impact of Lega Nord (column 1). We find that Lag*LegaNord Mayor 
is positive and statistically significant and LegaNord Mayor is negative and larger in magnitude than 
in previous estimates. This implies that the immediate effect is stronger (about -0.12) and then 
attenuates as time goes by. After three years the impact is almost halved. In column 2 we estimate the 
impact considering only the first and second year after the election: we find a strong immediate effect, 
with the same magnitude as in previous columns. In column 3 we instead estimate considering only 
third, fourth and fifth year after elections. This confirms the reduction of the impact over time.  
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
In Table 9 we carry out a falsification check in the spirit of Lee (2008). We investigate if the 
election of a Lega Nord Mayor in year t has any effect on the flows of immigrants in the previous                                                         
7 Notice that typically municipal elections are held in May-June. 
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years.  In our RDD framework this should not occur and any anticipation effects would cast doubt on 
our identification approach, since this would show that immigrant flows are related to some municipal 
characteristics rather than to a victory or a loss of Lega Nord candidates in close elections. 
We estimate two separate models one for the year prior to the election, the other for two years 
previous. In both cases there is no evidence of a link between a future narrow LN victory and 
migration patterns. The point estimates in both cases are not statistically significant and the effect 
sizes are close to zero.  
INSERT TABLE 10 
 
A further issue is that our narrow victories may be either for incumbents (e.g. existing Lega 
Nord Mayors retaining their position) or municipalities that change mayor. In the latter case we might 
expect any effect on subsequent immigrant mobility to be larger. Table 10 presents results where we 
include in addition a dummy indicator for changing mayor, and this indicator interacted with LN 
mayor victory. The sum of the two estimated coefficients for the interaction provides the additional 
effect (at the discontinuity) of a LN mayoral victory when this is by a new mayoral team. As reported 
in Table 10 the effect of a LN mayoral victory is essentially doubled when this is a new mayor.  
Finally, we recognize that the negative effect of electing a mayor belonging to the Lega North 
on the inflows of immigrants in the municipality might derive from a variety of channels. For instance, 
it may reflect a response to a perceived increase in anti-immigrant feeling. In this sense the election of 
a mayor with declared anti-immigration views may legitimatize stigmatizing behaviors and generates 
a more uncomfortable environment for immigrants. This type of effect has been, for instance, widely 
discussed in the press8 in relation to the election of Donald Trump who during his electoral campaign 
has portrayed immigrants as threats to American values and Americans’ safety. Similarly, the recent 
‘Brexit’ referendum in the United Kingdom led to a spike in anti-foreigner crime. At the same time as 
this channel, the reduction in net migration may also reflect the expectation that a mayor supported by 
the Lega Nord will undertake political choices, for instance in terms of public expenditure, that will 
disadvantage immigrants.  
INSERT TABLE 11 
Although we cannot investigate the first channel directly, we seek to provide suggestive 
evidence on the second. We are able to observe the choices made by mayors in terms of public 
expenditure. More precisely, we use data from the local councils’ balance sheets to consider 
expenditures in the areas of social services. We estimate an analogue of equation (2) but considering 
as the dependent variable the fraction of social expenditures (the sum of expenditures devoted to social 
housing, to social assistance and care on total expenditures). While not solely directed towards non-
Italians, the social expenditures are used extensively by immigrants due to their demographic make-                                                        
8 See for instance http://www.vox.com/2016/11/17/13639138/trump-hate-crimes-attacks-racism-xenophobia-
islamophobia-schools 
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up. As shown in column (1) of Table 11, we find a negative and weakly statistically significant effect 
of Lega Nord mayoral victories on these expenditures. This pattern may simply reflect the fact that 
Lega Nord mayors are more likely to be fiscally conservative. To explore this in column (2) we 
perform the same exercise on another major part of municipal expenditure, that directed towards 
elderly people, a group in which immigrants are typically a very small minority. There is neither a 
statistically significant nor economically meaningful effect of Lega Nord Mayors. Finally, in column 
(3) we consider as outcome variable total expenditure (in thousands of euros) and again we do not find 
any statistically significant effect of Lega Nord Mayors. This fits with recent regression discontinuity 
based evidence that suggests no difference in overall municipal expenditure according to Mayoral 
political alignment in Italy (Bracco et al 2015).  While far from definitive, this exercise suggests that 
part of the response of immigrants to Lega Nord mayoral victories may reflect reactions to the 
reduction in the provision of public services. This is an avenue that future research should consider.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
There appears to be a rapid and marked increase in the popularity and vote share of anti-immigration 
parties across a range of jurisdictions. While previous research considers the potential causes of this, 
and the extent to which immigration itself may generate support for these parties, little is known about 
how these patterns influence migration decisions. We provide evidence on this by examining mayoral 
elections in Northern Italy, and the effect of victories by Italy’s primary anti-immigration party, Lega 
Nord.  
We use a Regression Discontinuity framework to disentangle the causal effect of electing a 
Lega Nord mayor from municipal factors related to the electoral support for Lega Nord and from other 
potential omitted variables, by focusing on municipalities in which Lega Nord candidates win or lose 
the electoral competition by narrow margins.  
We demonstrate that immigrant’s location decisions do react to the election of mayors of, or 
supported by, Lega Nord. Specifically, these events have marked effects on net flows of immigration 
in municipalities. This appears to be driven almost entirely by individuals choosing not to move into 
these places following the election of Lega Nord mayors. These decisions are concentrated in the early 
periods following the election and reflect a mixture of the choices of existing foreigners resident and 
registered in Italy and newly registered immigrants. That these narrow victories of parties that utilise 
anti-immigrant rhetoric have a marked effect on immigrant behaviour is also noteworthy given the 
recent Brexit referendum and Donald Trump presidential victory.  
A question naturally is what drives these patterns? We provide suggestive evidence that, as well as 
the effect of increases in local hostility towards foreigners, it could also reflect changes in public 
provision of services demanded more by foreigners.  
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The combination of greater immigrant flows into Europe and the rise of far-right parties makes 
understanding the mechanisms that drive these location effects highly relevant and an important focus 
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Figure 1 Regions with a  Lega Nord Presence (Left), Municipalities where Lega Nord ran for 
Municipal Elections (Centre) and Municipalities where Lega Nord was part of the Ruling Coalition 





Figure 2 The Density of Margin of Victory Centred Around the Zero Margin  
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Figure 3. The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Net Immigrant Flows 
 
Notes. The black line is a first-order polynomial in Margin of Victory fitted separately on each side of the 
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Table 1. Municipal Descriptive Statistics, 2002-2014 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Net Inflow 0.633 0.622 -1.018 2.798 13,673 
Inflow (total) 1.649 0.872 0.000 6.486 13,673 
Outflow (total) 1.016 0.651 0.000 5.443 13,673 
LegaNord Mayor 0.280 0.449 0.000 1.000 13,673 
Margin of Victory -0.159 0.262 -0.857 0.740 13,673 
Population 15.033 49.137 0.043 1164.240 13,673 
Education 9.068 0.640 6.558 12.042 13,671 
Income 20.060 3.363 8.776 44.663 13,673 
Area sq.km 0.031 0.043 0.001 0.653 13,672 
Altitude 0.183 0.185 0.000 2.035 13,672 
Urban 0.360 0.480 0.000 1.000 13,666 
Share Agric. 0.041 0.037 0.002 0.370 13,657 
Share Industry 0.380 0.093 0.100 0.750 13,657 
Share Trade 0.182 0.037 0.075 0.685 13,657 
Source: Istat Resident Foreigners; Historical Archive of Municipal Election, Interior Ministry; ISTAT Italian 
Census of Population    
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Table 2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Lega Nord Victory on Predetermined 
Municipal Characteristics.  
 
Dependent Variables (1) 













Share Agriculture 0.000 
 (0.003) 
Share Industry 0.009 
 (0.009) 
Share Trade -0.004 
 (0.004) 
Observations 4832 
Coefficients on LegaNord Mayor from RD regression in which the dependent variable is, in turn, the 
variable on the first column. The control variables are Margin of Victory, Margin of Victory* LegaNord 
Mayor, year dummies and provincial dummies.     
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Table 3. The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Net Immigrant Flows, Parametric RDD 
Estimates.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lega Nord (LN) Mayor -0.072*** -0.081*** -0.093** -0.108*** -0.103*** -0.087*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.040) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) 
Margin of Victory (MV) -0.002 -0.021 -0.241 0.193 0.328** 0.337** 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.182) (0.163) (0.155) (0.148) 
MV * LN Mayor  0.105 0.806** 0.109 -0.139 -0.304 
  (0.126) (0.353) (0.326) (0.315) (0.310) 
MV2   -0.350 -0.118 0.084 0.364 
   (0.277) (0.247) (0.235) (0.227) 
MV2 * LN Mayor   -0.658 -0.521 -0.441 -0.384 
   (0.644) (0.611) (0.591) (0.607) 
Population      0.001*** 
      (0.000) 
Education      0.116*** 
      (0.035) 
Income      -0.026*** 
      (0.007) 
Area (km2)      0.762*** 
      (0.252) 
Altitude      -0.681*** 
      (0.078) 
Urban      0.034 
      (0.023) 
Year dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipal characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 13673 13673 13673 13673 13670 13648 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.196 0.244 0.283 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is Net Immigrant Flow. Standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01   
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Table 4. The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Net Immigrant Flows. Local Linear 
Regressions and Alternative Bandwidths. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Optimal Bandwidth 0.5*Optimal Bandwidth 
Lega Nord (LN) Mayor -0.085* -0.082** -0.127* -0.111* 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.065) (0.061) 
Margin of Victory (MV) 0.252 0.361 0.477 -0.112 
 (0.358) (0.334) (0.975) (0.898) 
MV * LN Mayor -0.050 -0.115 0.445 1.149 
 (0.534) (0.490) (1.361) (1.223) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics NO YES NO YES 
Observations 4832 4829 2415 2415 
R-squared 0.253 0.299 0.241 0.308 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is Net Immigrant Flow. Standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 





























Table 5. The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Immigrant Inflows and Outflows, Local Linear 
Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Inflow Outflow 
 Optimal  0.5*Optimal Optimal  0.5*Optimal 
LegaNord Mayor -0.080 -0.184* 0.002 -0.074 
 (0.072) (0.105) (0.048) (0.067) 
Margin of Victory 1.025* 1.338 0.663* 1.450 
 (0.582) (1.587) (0.386) (1.001) 
MV * LegaNord Mayor -1.255 0.432 -1.140** -0.717 
 (0.851) (2.187) (0.574) (1.427) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4829 2415 4829 2415 
R-squared 0.363 0.422 0.446 0.503 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected  




Table 6. Lega Nord and Immigrant flows from other municipalities / new registrations,  Local 
Linear Regressions.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) 












Lega Nord (LN) Mayor -0.057*** -0.043 -0.029 -0.045 0.028 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.009) 
Margin of Victory (MV) 0.191 0.409* 0.295 0.443* 0.103 0.034 
 (0.175) (0.238) (0.251) (0.262) (0.248) (0.077) 
MV * LN Mayor 0.148 -0.426 -0.468 -0.432 -0.616* -0.006 
 (0.255) (0.344) (0.359) (0.376) (0.358) (0.112) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4826 4826 4826 4826 4826 4826 
R-squared 0.071 0.434 0.336 0.409 0.368 0.174 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7. Robustness of Main Estimates of Net Inflows to Alternative Lega Nord Measures, Local 
Linear Regressions. 
 









Lega Nord/Centre Right Coalition -0.060* -0.135***   
 (0.034) (0.049)   
Lega Nord Mayor/Deputy Only   -0.129** -0.215** 
   (0.066) (0.103) 
Margin of Victory  0.166 -0.198 0.458 0.052 
 (0.247) (0.909) (0.351) (0.981) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6669 3495 3411 1664 
R2 0.294 0.306 0.304 0.308 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8. The Timing of Lega Nord Effects on Net Inflows, Local Linear Regressions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Only first and second 
year 
3rd-5th years 
LegaNord Mayor -0.117*** -0.113** -0.068 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.048) 
Lag* LegaNord Mayor 0.018*   
 (0.010)   
Margin of Victory (MV) 0.359 0.359 0.433 
 (0.334) (0.420) (0.393) 
MV * LegaNord Mayor -0.103 0.147 -0.356 
 (0.491) (0.617) (0.565) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES 
Observations 4829 2030 2799 
R2 0.299 0.318 0.302 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9. The Impact of Lega Nord Mayor Elections on Net Immigrant Flow in year t-1 and t-2, Local 
Linear Regressions. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 t-1 t-2 
LegaNord Mayor -0.020 0.006 
 (0.069) (0.061) 
Lag* LegaNord Mayor 0.075 -0.110 
 (0.321) (0.276) 
Margin of Victory (MV) -0.001 -0.208 
 (0.743) (0.540) 
MV * LegaNord Mayor 2717 2677 
 0.266 0.262 
Year dummies YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES 
Observations 2717 2717 
R2 0.266 0.266 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10. Lega Nord Effects, NewMayors and Incumbents. Impact on Net Inflow, Local Linear 
Regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LegaNord Mayor (LN) -0.106** -0.089* -0.094** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.047) 
Switcher*LN -0.103** -0.149*** -0.107** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.045) 
Switcher  0.134*** 0.172*** 0.142*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) 

















Year dummies YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies NO YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
NO NO YES 
Observations 11257 11255 11237 
R-squared 0.179 0.230 0.272 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
   
29  
Table 11 The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Municipal Expenditure Expenditure. Local 
Linear Regressions.  
 Social Expenditure Elderly Expenditure Total Expenditure 
Lega Nord (LN) Mayor - 0.874* 0.021 13.452 
 (0.489) (0.265) (14.835) 






MV*LN Mayor 0.629 2.577 115.785 
 (5.963) (3.203) (228.112) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES 
Observations 4114 4197 4225 
R-squared 0.2922 0.1229 0.9476 
The table reports OLS estimates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the municipal level.. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
                      
   
     
          
